The sense of urgency that some cognitive psychologists felt about suggestive trauma-memory-oriented approaches to therapy was understandable, even laudatory. But it was in tension with the ideals of science. Many of us, me included, worked to develop compelling demonstrations of false memories and false beliefs for non-trivial childhood pseudoevents. The situation demanded such demonstrations, as trauma-oriented therapists were unimpressed by the earlier demonstrations of false reports of stop signs versus yield signs. Demonstrations are valuable, but they must be interpreted with caution. Much of the research sparked by the recovered memories controversy was done before the methodological reform movement got going in 2010 (for an engaging and comprehensive review, see Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018). So the falsememory studies were not preregistered (i.e., no date-stamped, detailed plan for conducting the study and analyzing the data), leaving researchers with many decisions to make along the way (“research degrees of freedom”). Also, the number of subjects tested in individual studies was typically quite small, especially in the studies that most closely mapped to therapy situations, and information about how sample size was determined was rarely provided (so some studies may have based decisions as to whether to stop or continue data collection on how good the results looked). Also, it’s likely that some trauma-analog studies that were conducted were not published because they “didn’t work” (i.e., did not yield evidence of consistent with the hypothesis that suggestive influences often lead to false memories).