Scholarship on the frailties of memory has often been polarized. Early work on the fallibility of eyewitnesses’ memory for details (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) tended to have a political tone, with claims about memory vulnerability aligning with defense-aligned commitments to protecting innocent suspects from miscarriages of justice. In the 1980s, controversy swirled around cases in which young children came to report extreme instances of sexual abuse (sometimes with bizarre and highly implausible elements of Satanism, animal sacrifices, murder, etc.). Some child development researchers emphasized evidence of young children’s vulnerability to suggestive influences (and other reasons to doubt the veracity of these sorts of allegations. Other developmentalists emphasized evidence of young children’s ability to give accurate accounts (and other reasons to give credence to abuse allegations). In the 1990s the emphasis switched to cases in which adults reported recovering memories of previously unknown histories of childhood sexual abuse. There too scholarly discourse tended to be polarized, with many memory researchers emphasizing reasons to doubt allegations of childhood abuse based on reported recovered memories and many clinicians emphasizing reasons to believe such allegations. In my perception, many psychologists on both sides of these controversies felt an urgent sense of moral mission. And quite properly so. There are good grounds for concern that powerfully suggestive interview techniques and approaches to trauma-oriented therapy can lead people to develop false beliefs (and sometimes even false memories) of abuse that did not really happen. And there are overwhelming grounds for concern about real sexual abuse of children and about cultural forces that keep such abuse in the shadows. Some on one side of the Memory Wars heard first-hand the stories of parents whose adult children had accused them of appalling and improbable forms of abuse. Some on the other side heard first-hand accounts of real abuse. Of course, real abuse is a much more important problem. But the problem of suggestive approaches to trauma-oriented therapy could relatively easily be solved by convincing proponents of those approaches of their risks.